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Cert to CA~ nnedy, 
11 Merritt, Weick) 
/;? ..eLe_ V '.k, f-, ~ L.,U . ~~--v. 
KENTUCKY DEP'T OF EDUC. Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether a. federal agency may recoup grant 
=-----...----,. 
funds that it determines to have been misspent by a state where 
there is no evidence ~6f bad faith and where the state's program 
is based upon the state's own reasonable interpretation of the 
law. - 2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides federal 
~ (, f S' ~t ~+- ~ ✓ f <-\- \»' f H t~ VL C G--- fo fu_ 
o { +d,e/J ~✓o.~ (H'OJr~- ~.h} 
funding for _ 




"meeting the sp.e_cial educational needs of educationally deprived ,, 
children." 20 u.s.c. §2701. State and local educational 
agencies obtain federal funds upon providing assurances to the 
Secretary of Education that the funds will be spent only on 
--=-
qualifying programs and in full compliance with statutory 
requirements. One of the requirements is that federal funds be 
sources. Th 
than supplant funds from non-federal 
~
rovides: 
Federal funds made available under this subchapter will 
be so used (i) as to supplement and, to the extent 
practical, increase the level of funds that would, in 
the absence of such Federal funds, be made available 
from non-federal sources for the education of pupils 
participating in programs and projects assisted under 
this subchapter, and (ii) in no case, as to supplant 
such funds from non-federal sources .... 20 u.s.c. § 
2 ~ ) (3) (B) • 
promulgated under that statute provides: 
Each application for a grant ... shall contain an 
assurance that the use of the grant funds will not 
result in a decrease in the use for educationally 
deprived children residing in that project area of 
State or local funds which, in the absence of funds 
under Title I of the Act, would be made available for 
that project area and that neither the project area nor 
the educationally deprived children residing therein 
will otherwise be penalized in the application of State 
and local funds because of such use of funds under 
Title I of the Act .•.. Federal funds made available 
for that [Title I] project (1) will be used to 
supplement, and to the extent practical increase, the 
level of State and local funds that would, in the 
absence of such Federal funds, be made available for 
the education of pupils participating in that project; 
(2) will not be used to supplant State and local funds 
available for the education of such pupils •••• 45 
C.F.R. 116.17(h). 
Kentucky established a system of "readiness" instruction, 
under which educationally deprived children were taught in self-
contained classrooms separate from the rest of the school's 
It 
- --3-
pupils during first, and in some cases second, grade. The state, 
in essence, took the deprived children 
placed them in these readiness classes. Th 
~ lasses and 
·of 
instruction in read i ness classes--as well as part of the cost o 
administration--was paid for out of Title I funds. Title I 
children continued to receive "enrichment" services (physical 
education, music, art, and library) at state expense. The 
state's allocation of funds to the local education agencies 
(LEA's) was not reduced. 
This case arose when auditors from HEW determined that 
during FY 1974 50 school districts in Kentucky had spent $704,000 
of Title I grant funds in violation of the prohibition against 
using such funds to supplant state funds. The basis for that --=---- -
decision was that without federal funding the state would have 
spent a certain amount of money on instruction of deprived 
children in the regular classrooms, but after it got the grant it 
stopped spending any money on their instruction. The state 
the auditor's recommendation on the ground that there had 
en no decrease in state or local funding of the schools or 
grade levels involved. 
The Education Appeal Board affirmed the auditor's findings. 
It framed the question as "whether the statutory and regulatory 
prohibition against supplanting State and local funds with Title 
I funds should be measured with reference to expenditure at the 
level of the LEA, the school, the grade, the classroom or the 
individual educationally deprived pupil." The Board focused upon 





to funds available for "educationally deprived children" in 
reaching its conclusion that "the statutory and regulatory 
provisions are sufficiently clear in their emphasis on the 
expenditure of funds for pupils--not LEA's, schools, or grade 
leels--to sustain the Assistant Secretary's position." The 
Appeal Board found it clear that there was a decrease in the use 
of state funds for instruction of Title I children. 
The Secretary upheld the Appeal Board's determination that a 
violation of the supplanting prohibition had occurred. However, 
he reduced the amount of repayment to $338,000, based upon the 
fact that the pupil-teacher ratio in the readiness classes was 
substantially lower than that prevailing in regular classrooms. 
The Secretary concluded that the children in readiness classes 
had therefore received some benefit beyond what they would have 
received from the regular program. 
On appeal, the CA6 rejected respondent's contention that the 
Secretary lacked authority to require refunds of misspent Title I 
funds, because that issue was resolved in the Secretary's favor 
by this Court's decision in ~ ll v. New Jersey, 51 U.S.L.W. 4647 
(1983). It then went on to note resp's contention that no 
supplanting had occurred (since the LEA's maintained the same 
number of state-funded regular classroom teachers) and petr's 
argument that state expenditures on educationally deprived 
children were reduced. The CA stated: 
It cannot be said that the interpretation posited by 
the Secretary is "unreasonable." The statutory and 
regulatory prohibitions against supplanting State and 
local funds with Title I funds can reasonably be 
applied with reference to expenditures at the level of 




than at the level of either the LEA, the school, the 
grade, or the classroom. Nonetheless, in the instant 
case we do not feel that it is our task on appeal to 
review the reasonableness of the Secretary's 
interpretation •..• We are not reviewing with reference 
to the future effect of the Secretary's interpretation 
of a statute. Rather, in this appeal we are concerned 
with the fairness of imposing sanctions upon the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky for its "failure to 
substantially comply" with the [statutory requirements] 
as those requirements were ultimately interpreted by 
the Secretary. 
The CA disagreed with the Secretary that the statute and 
regulations were "sufficiently clear to apprise the Commonwealth 
of its responsibilities under the Act." The CA noted that the 
legislative history was full of references to Congress' intent to 
leave to the (aiscretion of the participating states the 
responsibility to establish programs with Title I funds. The CA 
acknowledged that the interpretation of the statute posited by 
the Commonwealth was not controlling and stated that the 
Secretary's interpretation will govern all future dealings. It 
continued: 
We hold only that in the absence of unambiguous 
st~ and regulatory requirements, and i n the 
presence o a spec1 tc-~scretion to the 
Commonwealth to develop and administer programs it 
CA to s 
~ 
believes to be consistent with the intentions of Title - ~ 
I, it is unfair for the Secretary to assess a penalty 
against the Commonwealth for its purported failure to ~ 
comply substantially with the requirements of law, ~LL.' 1 
where there is no evidence of bad faith and the o-- ( _.._..~ 
Commonwealth's program complies with a reasonable 
interpretation of the law. 
The CA relied in part on Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), in 
which the Court stated that if Congress intends to impose a 
condition on the grant of federal moneys (in that case a duty to 
provide the "least restrictive treatment" possible to handicapped 




rationale was that spending power legislation is in the nature of 
a contract and that the legitimacy of conditions rests on the 
state's voluntary and knowing acceptance of them. The CA 
concluded that Kentucky was "unaware of the condition that the 
Secretary now seeks to impose," and that therefore the Secretary 
was not justified in assessing a penalty. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
Government: The Government argues that its right to recover 
✓ 
misspent funds under Bell v. New Jersey is effectively 
eviscerated by the CA decision. There is no justification for 
the CA's construction of the Government's recoupment remedy. The 
---- --
crucial issue in a refund proceeding is whether the grant 
.__, 
recipient has used federal funds in a manner that violates the 
terms and conditions of the grant statute and regulations. 
Despite the CA's conclusion that the Secretary's interpretation 
of the supplanting provisions was reasonable, the CA refused to 
allow recoupment. The CA's announcement that the Secretary's 
interpretation of the supplanting provisions would be given 
prospective effect highlights the anomaly of the CA's ruling. 
It has long been established that agencies may choose to 
develop interpretations of the law retroactively through 
adjudication rather than prospectively through rulemaking. SEC 
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The choice between 
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the agency's discretion. 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
There is no reason why the Secretary's right to recoup 





its use of funds. The CA was incorrect in its assumption that 
recovery of the funds constitutes a "penalty." The Secretary is 
merely attempting to recover monies that were not spent in 
accordance with the federal statute and regulations. 
Finally, nothing in Pennhurst supports the CA's decision. 
There can be no question that Pennhurst's requirement of 
legislative clarity does not prevent the Secretary from ensuring 
that federal funds are spent in accordance with congressional 
restrictions. No grant recipient could ever have thought 
otherwise. 
The decision below also conflicts with other circuits. For 
example, the CA4 in West Virginia v. Secretary of Education, 667 
F. 2d 417 (1981), stated that where neither the legislative 
history nor the decisions of the Secretary give any clue as to 
what the proper interpretation of Title I should be, the 
Secretary's decision should be given deference and misspent funds 
should be refunded. Similarly, in Indiana v. Bell, 728 F. 2d 938 
(1984), the CA7 sustained the Secretary's finding of an audit 
deficiency, giving deference to the Secretary's interpretation of 
Title I, despite the fact that its discussion suggests that at 
least one of the positions advanced by the state may have met the 
CA6's standard of reasonableness. 
The CA's decision can be expected to have a substantial 
adverse impact on the Secretary's ability to recoup the 
approximately $68 million in currently outstanding Title I audit 
claims, $33 million of which are supplanting claims. Moreover, 
the impact of the decision is not limited to Title I programs; it 
It 
- --8-
would change the ground rules for all manner of federal grant 
funds. 
Respondent:The Government incorrectly frames the issue in 
this case. The issue is is not whether the Government has a 
right to recoupment for misspent funds; instead, the issue is 
what substantive standard is applied to the question whether the 
state has met its Title I obligations. The substantive standard 
developed by the Sixth Circuit was that the claim of violation is 
to be judged by a standard of "fairness." As part of this 
standard comes the consideration of substantial compliance. The 
giving of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute 
and the consideration of the substantive standard against which a 
state's actions are to be measured are separate issues. The 
Government's suggestion that the CA6 decision can be expected to 
have an adverse impact on not only Title I cases, but other 
federal grant programs as well is pure sophistry. There is no 
reason to think that states will be less than honest in handling 
federal grant programs if there is room to believe such action 
can be gotten by with. "Suffice it to say States are not crooks 
waiting for their chance to be dishonest." 
Respondent relies (as did the CA6) on Justice White's 
concurring opinion in Bell v. New Jersey, in which he stated that 
the cases reviewed in that decision: 
... do not involve any question as to the substantive 
standard by which a claim that a recipient has violated 
its Title I commitments is to be judged. Rather, they 
concern the abstract question whether the Secretary has 
the right to recover Title I funds under any 
circumstances. In my view there is a significant issue 
whether a State can be required to repay if it has 
committed no more than a technical violation of the 
-. 
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agreement or if the claim of violation rests on a new 
regulation or construction of the statute issued after 
the State entered the program and had its plan 
approved. 51 U.S.L.W., at 4653. 
4. DISCUSSION: The CA just has to be wrong. If it had 
concluded that the state's interpretation was more reasonable 
than the Secretary's but then deferred to the Secretary's 
inte~pretation as within the realm of reason, the fairness 
argument would have more force. Instead, however, it held that 
because the state's interpretation was within the realm of reason 
and there was no evidence of bad faith, no refund could be 
required. 
Resp's interpretation of the issue presented in this case is 
wrong. The CA accepted the conclusion that the substantive (CA,-'=' 
standards of Title I had been violated. The question it )Z'i.-
addre s sea- ts Ehe quest i on the "SG-'raises: assuming a failure of ~ 
substantial compliance with statutory standards, what is the ~ 0 
standard under which to determine whether recoupment is to be 
permitted? 
I think it plain that the Secretary's interpretation of 
Title I is correct. The statute was intended to prevent federal 
funds from supplanting state funds with respect to Title I 
children. When the state established the readiness classes, it 
transferred the economic burden of instruction from itself to the 
federal government. Although the state continued to spend as 
much money on education, it did so by increasing the per-pupil 
expenditure on children in regular classrooms and decreasing the 
per-pupil expenditure on Title I children. That seems pretty 
clearly contrary to congressional intent. 
• 
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It does not seem unfair to require refund of the federal 
funds that were misspent. Although resp and the CA liken the 
situation here to that involved in Pennhurst, there is a 
substantial difference between the two cases. Pennhurst involved 
the imposition of a new and unexpected obligation on the state. 
In this case, the state's obligation not to supplant state funds 
with federal funds was clear. The sole question is whether the 
particular scheme established by the state constituted 
supplanting. That kind of judgment is typically made through 
adjudication, and I seriously doubt that if this were a criminal 
case there would be much support for the view that it would 
violate due process to convict under these facts. In this case, 
however, the Secretary's action was not punitive, but instead 
remedial. The state was simply required to return funds that the 
Secretary properly determined were misspent. 
The conflict asserted by the SG is far from clear, since the -----CA'S in those cases were apparently not presented with the 
argument adopted by the CA6 in this case. Although it is 
posssible that the CA6 might have come to a different conclusion 
than the CA4 and CA7 in the cases cited by the SG, until the 
other courts explicitly reject the analysis of the CA6 there does 
not seem to be enough of a conflict to grant simply on that 
basis. 
Justice White's concurring opinion in Bell v. New Jersey is 
not that helpful to respondent's position. The state's violation 
in this case can hardly be called "technical." Moreover, this 
case involves a new construction of the statute only in the sense 
a. 
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that no one had ever violated it in quite this way before; it is 
not a case where the state implemented its plan based upon 
reliance on a construction of a statute that was later modified. 
The SG is correct that the analysis employed by the CA could 
\ have dramatic implications for any number of federal spending 
l programs. In order to avoid the obligation to repay funds, the 
state need not be right; it need only be reasonable. The facts 
of this case highlight the problem. The Secretary's 
interpretation of the statute and regulations is the most 
reasonable, but because the state's position is one that could be 
made with a straight face, recoupment was not allowed. Given 
that there will seldom be evidence of bad faith, the recoupment 
remedy allowed in Bell v. New Jersey may not mean much after this 
decision. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting the petn. 
There is a response. 
June 21, 1984 Browne Opin in petn. 
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December 27, 1984 
BELL GINA-POW 
83-1798 Bell, Secretary of Education v. Kentucky 
Department of Education(CA6) 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case arises under Title I of Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 - a statute providing 
federal financial assistance for programs "which 
contribute particularly to meeting the special educational 
needs of educational deprived children" in areas where 
there are high concentration of children from low income 
families. The funds are intended to benefit this special 
group of children. 
to be administered 
The federal funds are made available 
by the states subject to regula.tions 
adopted by the Secretary of Education. 
In addition to requiring that Title I funds are used 
only to provide supplemental assistance for the education 
of deprived children in low income areas, the regulations 
also purport to assure that the federal funds are used · to 
supplement and not supplant state and local funds that 
otherwise would have been spent on the particular pupils 
in the special education programs • 
,A 
• 
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The Act provides for auditing of the states 
expenditure of the funds. In this case the auditor 
concluded that federal funding had replaced the state and 
local funds that otherwise would have been spent on first 
or second grade children in "readiness classes". Such 
classes differed somewhat from other supplementary 
education provided in subjects such as mathematics, the 
English language, etc. . The "readiness classes" were for 
slow learners who needed special tutoring help in ~rder to 
be promoted from first and second grade. In any event, 
the auditors concluded that the state had misspent 
$704,000 - a figure subsequently reduced by the Secretary 
to some $300,000. The Federal Government sought a refund 
of money misspent. Kentucky's appeal was rejected by the 
Appeals Board and by the Secretary. 
CA6 reversed decisions by the Appeals Board of the 
Department of Education and by the Secretary. The Court 
of Appeals acknowledged that the regulations were 
"reasonable" but thought they were ambiguous, and found 
that the State had not acted in "bad faith" when it 
adopted a different interpretation that also was 
reasonable. Therefore, CA6 held that al though the 
• 
- - 3. 
Secretary's regulations would apply for the future, the 
State could not be required to repay the misspent funds. 
The SG argues strongly and persuasively that the 
court's decision is erroneous and could have an 
unfortunate precedental effect. Where Congress has 
specifically authorized an agency or a department to adopt 
regulations, and where the Secretary - acting within his 
authority - has approved the regulation as reasonable, the 
court should not conclude that they may not be followed if 
viewed as ambiguous and where the state has not acted in 
bad faith. 
Although one can be sympathetic to the State's 
position, I also am impressed by the SG's argument that 
the state at least - in view of the alleged ambiguity of 
the regulations - should have requested a ruling from the 
Department of Education before misapplying • 
* * * 
Subject to more careful consideration of this case 
and to the arguments, I am inclined to reverse. I should 
say, however, that I think the Attorney General of 
Kentucky has filed a well-written brief that presents non-
frivolous arguments. It is much better than the usual 
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Unless my clerk has a different view (that I would 
welcome), a summary memo will suffice. 
* * * 
Note to my Clerk: Case No. 83-2064, Bell, Secretary of 
Education v. State of New Jersey, also is to be argued at 
the January Session. I believe these two cases are to be 
argued back to back, as both involve Title I of the 
Education Act. The issues are different, but it may be 
desirable that the same clerk be responsible for both 
cases • 
LFP, JR . 
- -
83-1798 BELL v. KENTUCKY Argued 1/8/85 
- -~ No. 8 3-1798 , Bell v. Kentucky Board of Education Conf. 1/11/85 .. 















JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
• jluprtnu <!+ltlttt of tl{t 1{nittb jlhdtg ,rz-~ ~. <II• in~~ 
February 15, 1985 
Re: 83-1798 - Bell v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed. 
83-2064 - Bell v. New Jersey 
Dear Sandra: 
In the Kentucky case you have written a fine 
opinion which I expect to join. However, since I 
remain unpersuaded in the New Jersey case and will be 
writing a dissent, I will not join the Kentucky case 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMll!IERS OF" 
J U STICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Sandra: 
-,ju:prtmt Of o-url o-f ffrt ~h ,jtatts 
,ru~ ~- Of. 21lffe"' 
-
No. 83-1798 -- Bell v. Kentucky 
Please join me. 
February 15, 1985 
I have one question, however, concerning the first sentence 
on page 13. You define the recoupment inquiry in terms of 
conditions existing "at the time the grants were made." I 
generally agree, but believe that the point when the State 
actually expends the money may also be relevant. Many Government 
grants are made for the forthcoming year; I can well imagine 
circumstances in which the Government might be able to adjust or 
clarify requirements after "the grants were made" but before the 
funds were actually expended. In light of the number of 
recoupment cases pending in federal courts, this might be a 
significant distinction. I'd prefer to keep the standard just a 
bit more ambiguous. What would you think of revising the 
sentence to read: " ••• at the time the grants were made and the 
funds expended"? If you agree, this might require a comparable 
revision to the last sentence in Part III. 
In any event, I'll be happy to defer to your expertise and 
decision either way. 
Sincerely, 
15-f. /, I /) 
/ ( 0\_Ji 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'coNNOR 
Dear Bill, 
- • 
.in.vrtutt <!lourt o-f tqt :Jlniith J;talt.s-
Jf ulfi:ttgt.on, ~. ~- 2.0~)l., 
February 15, 1985 
No. 83-1798 Bell v. Kentucky 
I agree that it is desirable to leave somewhat 
ambiguous the precise time that determines the correct legal 
standards for evaluating compliance with the requirements of 
Title I. In this regard, my use of the phrase "when the grants 
were made" is deliberate. This phrase could refer to the time 
when the state education agency approved applications submitted 
by local school districts, received federal funds from the 
Secretary, or disbursed funds to local education agencies for 
approved programs. See 20 u.s.c. S24le(a} (1976 ed.} (referring 
to receipt of grant by local education agency}; id. S24lg(a) (1) 
(payment of funds to State); id. S24lg(a) (2) (distribution of 
funds by state education agency to local education agencies for 
approved applications}. 
Thus, I believe that the phrase "when the grants were 
made" would allow the Federal Government to clarify the 
requirements after a state education agency approved applications 
but before the state agency actually distributed federal funds to 
local school districts. Title I funds were to be expended within 
a two-year period. See 20 u.s.c. Sl225(b}. I would prefer to 
avoid the issue whether a State may be found liable where the 
actual expenditures for a local program conformed to requirements 
in place when the State approved the application and distributed 
the funds, but did not satisfy a requirement or clarification 
adopted after the money was out of the hands of the state 
education agency. The phrase "when the grants were made," I 
acknowledge, might suggest a negative answer. On the other hand, 
addition of the language "and the funds expended" would seem 
clearly to indicate that the State could be liable. 
Consequently, I am presently inclined to stick with "when the 
grants were made." 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
' .l'ltpTtmt Q}o-urt o-f tlf t ~tb ilta!t.9' 
Jlag£rmgttm, ~. <!}. 2(1~)!~ 
-
C H .. MBERS O F" 
JUSTICE BYRO N R. WH ITE February 18, 1985 
83-1798 -
Bell v. Kentucky Department of Education 
Dear Sandra, 
I join all but Part III of your 
circulating draft. In light of Part IV, Part 
III seems unnecessary, and I have some doubts 
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-
CHAMBE:RS O f' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
.iu:prtmt ~1tllrl gf tlrt ~tb .iudts 
-asifingtott. ~- OJ. 21lffe'l, 
February 19, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1798 Bell v. Kentucky Department of Education 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 




$6uprtmt <lJond of tJrt ~h .jtatu 
11Jae4ittghtn.. ~- OJ. 211p'!~ 
CHAMeEAS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 21, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1798-Bell v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed. 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 






JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
~upi-.tmt <!fltltrl of t1ft 1{niub' ~bdt• 
'JruJringhtn, ~- <!f. 2.llffe,.~ 
February 28, 1985 
Re: 83-1798 - Bell v. Kentucky Dept. of 
Education 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Respj;_ly, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
March 1, 1°-85 
83-1798 Bell v. Kentucky Department of Education 
Dear C3andra: 
Please add at the en1 of your nolnio~ that I took 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
..Suprmtt <qonrt of tqt ~~ .Statt• 
,ras-!finghtn. ~. <q. 2.llpJt., 
March 4, 1985 
-
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CHAMl!!ERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
- ' ilttp-rnm Q}ourl of l4t ~b •tatte-
'1ulp:ttgton. ~. (!}. 21lffe>I,, 
March 5, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1798, Bell v. Kentucky Dept. of Education 
Dear Sandra: 
I am where Byron is in this case. I, therefore, join 
your opinion except for Part III. 
Justice O'Connor 




83-1798 Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Education (Rory 
LFP out 3/1/85 
SOC for the Court 1/18/85 
1st draft 2/14/85 
2nd draft 3/6/85 
3rd draft 3/7/85 
Joined by WJB 2/15/85 
WHR 2/19/85 




BAB joins all except Part III 
3/5/85 
JPS will dissent 2/15/85 
